案件編號:11-cv-00718-RSM
存檔日期 12/22/11
頁數 1 of 5
地區法官: 理查德.馬丁尼斯
華盛頓州西區 西雅圖 美國地區法院
原告 范似棟 對 被告 美國
2011年10月5日,美國向法院呈交動議，要求駁回原告訴狀,其理由如下: (1)因為民法程序已廢除了冤案平反法令，而且冤案平反法令只適用於原判法院糾正該院所判案件，所以他沒有要求申請冤案平反法令的理由; (2)原告因為沒有在事發後的兩年內向適當的行政部門提交行政訴求，所以他失去了在聯邦侵權賠償法（FTCA）之下的行政補救賠償的機會; (3) 任何針對美國的民事訴訟都有6年的時效。參閱 Dkt. No. 14。
2011年12月19日,原告呈交動議，回覆被告動議。(1) 承認他不宜向這個法院申請冤案平反法令; (2) 辯稱他在FTCA名義下的訴求不存在時效問題; (3) 對美國提出新的指控，欺騙罪。 參閱 Dkt. No. 23。
I. 原告失去了在聯邦侵權賠償法（FTCA）之下的行政補救賠償的權利。
在上次要求駁回原告訴狀的動議中，美國辯稱原告因為沒有在事發後的兩年內向適當的行政部門提交行政訴求，所以他失去了在聯邦侵權賠償法名義之下的行政補救賠償的機會。參閱 Dkt. No. 14, at pg. 5-6。
聯邦侵權賠償法對侵權訴求有明確的時效期。參閱28 U.S.C. § 2401。聯邦侵權賠償法規定，訴求人必須在事發後兩年內向政府代理部門投訴，否則「針對美國的侵權訴訟就永遠被禁止」。參閱28 U.S.C. § 2401(b)。聯邦侵權賠償法的兩年時效期的規定，和其它實質法和程序法一樣，是政府主權豁免權的一項條件。參閱United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979)。因為這是主權豁免權的一部分，所以及時的行政投訴被嚴格要求執行。參閱以上案件之 117-118頁。
在原告的回覆中，他沒有對美國的辯解進行回答，他沒有說明他是否曾向政府部門提交行政投訴。他也沒有出示任何證據以證明和這次訴狀有關的他的行政投訴。單單因為這一點，原告的訴狀必須被駁回。參閱 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b)。
原告辯稱因為「罪證發現規則」他的訴求不存在時效問題。參閱 Dkt. No. 23, at pg. 10. 他聲辯他沒有及早對美國起訴是因為「他沒有實物證據或書面證據來證明美國卷入此案」，以及因為「要發現美國卷入此案的相關文字證據有困難」。參閱同上資料 pg. 3, 10.原告辯稱他最後在2008年得到了官方證據證明美國是此案的有關當事人。參閱同上資料 pg. 3-4。 從那時起，他想和中國政府和美國政府直接交涉, 最後於2011年4月他決心訴諸司法行動。參閱同上資料pg. 10。
通常來說，聯邦侵權賠償法 “訴訟提起的基礎是一個原告知道或有理由知道自己的傷害”。 參閱 Hensley v. United States, 531 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2008) (引自 Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1344 (9th Cir. 1986))。另外一般來說，政府僱員的無知和聯邦政府侵權的司法應管項目無關. (引自Dyniewicz v. United States, 742 F.2d 484, 487 (9th Cir. 1984))。 以實際情況來說，比如醫學方面的不當處置，司法應管項目不會立即發生，直至原告知道了傷害的存在和傷害的原因才會發生。(引自 Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 122-23)。 但是應管項目不包括原告意識到或不意識到政府的疏忽，不管這是真實的還是虛構的。
這樣，原告以疏忽罪對被告的指控，依其訴狀所述即美國沒有在他的1983年刑事審訊時提供無罪證明。正像原告所說，他最後得到的官方文件表明美國是個相關當事人，所以他的指控不能成立。
原告以欺騙罪對被告的指控，即指控一些政府官員從2002年到2009年對原告有關案件的回應不真實，属于誤導欺騙。原告應該在1985年以疏忽罪向有關聯邦政府部門投訴，或在2004年至2011年以欺騙罪向有關聯邦政府部門投訴。原告不能出示任何事發兩年內向行政部門投訴的證據，原告的疏忽罪和欺騙罪的訴訟，由於缺少事項司法管轄權，所以都必須被駁回。
II. 原告的欺騙罪指控必須被駁回。
即使原告曾經以欺騙罪積極進行行政投訴，現在也必須被駁回，因為聯邦侵權賠償法特別強調有意的侵權。按照 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2680, “任何起因於攻击，動武，非法拘禁，非法逮捕的指控, 惡意起訴, 誣訴，誹謗，造謠中傷，歪曲，欺騙，或者干扰合同權限”不在聯邦侵權賠償法範圍。原告的欺騙罪指控是“歪曲誤傳”( misrepresentation)的一種。參閱 Clark v. United States, 2007 WL 2358630 (N.D.Cal. 2007); F.D.I.C. v. Craft, 157 F.3d 697, 706 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Owyhee Grazing Ass’n, Inc. v. Field, 637 F.2d 694, 697 (9th Cir. 1981) “根據28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)，因為聯邦政府官員的行為而指控美國欺騙或歪曲誤傳被絕對禁止”。原告聲稱他於2008年得到美國涉及此案證據，在以後兩年中他應該進行行政投訴，但是他至今仍然沒有出示有關證據，這一點更是駁回的理由。
結論
根據以上所說，和美國前一駁回動議中的辯駁，美國懷著敬意地請求法院駁回原告的訴狀，因為該訴狀沒有說明要求賠償解決的理由，以及貴法院對該案缺少事項司法管轄權。
2011年12月22日。
珍妮 德開
美國國家律師
克莉絲蒂 約翰遜
美國國家律師助理
Case 2:11-cv-00718-RSM Document 24 Filed 12/22/11 Page 1 of 5
District Judge Ricardo S. Martinez
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE
STONE DONG FAN, ))
Plaintiff, ) NO. C11-0718-RSM )
v.
) UNITED STATES’ REPLY )
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ))
Defendants. )
__________________________________________)
On October 5, 2011, the United States filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint arguing that: (1) he failed to state a claim for relief to obtain a writ of coram nobis because the writ was abolished in civil proceedings such as this, and the writ can only issue in the court in which the conviction was had; (2) Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) by failing to file an administrative claim with the
appropriate agency within two years of the incident; and (3) any other civil claims against the United States are time barred under the general six-year statute of limitations for claims against the United States. See Dkt. No. 14. On December 19, 2011, Plaintiff filed a response where he:
(1) concedes that he cannot seek a writ of coram nobis from this Court; (2) argues that his claims are brought under the FTCA and are not time-barred; and (3) asserts a new claim for fraud. See Dkt. No. 23.
I. Plaintiff Failed to Exhaust His Administrative Remedies under the FTCA.
In its motion to dismiss, the United States argued that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the FTCA because he failed to file an administrative complaint with the appropriate agency within two years of the date it accrues. See Dkt. No. 14, at pg. 5-6.
The FTCA provides an express limitations period for the filing of a tort claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2401. Under the terms of the FTCA, a claimant is required to present his administrative claim to the agency within two years after the claim accrues, or the “tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred.” 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). The FTCA’s two-year limitations period, like other substantive or procedural restrictions on FTCA suits, is a condition on the government’s waiver of sovereign immunity. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979). Because it is part of the wavier of immunity, the requirement of the filing of a timely administrative claim must be strictly enforced. Id. at 117-118.
In his response, Plaintiff fails to address the United States’ argument. He does not claim that he ever presented an administrative claim to any agency. And he does not present any evidence to show that an administrative claim was ever filed based on the facts alleged in the complaint. On this basis alone, Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).
Plaintiff argues that his claims are not time-barred because of “the discovery rule.” See Dkt. No. 23, at pg. 10. He argues that he did not file a claim against the United States earlier because “he had no material evidence or documentary evidence which proves United States involved with the case,” and “it is difficult to find any relevant written evidence of the U.S. government directly involved with this case.” Id. at pg. 3, 10. Plaintiff argues that he finally obtained an “official document” in 2008 that “indicated America was one party concerned of the case.” Id. at pg. 3-4. Since then, he has been trying to obtain relief from the Chinese government and the U.S. government directly, and he finally decided to take legal action in April 2011. Id. at pg. 10.
As a general rule, a claim accrues under the FTCA “when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.” Hensley v. United States, 531 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1344 (9th Cir. 1986)). In addition, as a general rule, ignorance of the involvement of government employees is irrelevant to accrual of a federal tort claim. Id. (citing Dyniewicz v. United States, 742 F.2d 484, 487 (9th Cir. 1984)). In certain circumstances, such as claims involving medical malpractice, accrual
does not occur until a plaintiff knows of both the existence of an injury and its cause. Id. (citing Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 122-23). But accrual does not await a plaintiff’s awareness, whether actual or constructive, of the government’s negligence. Id.
Thus, Plaintiff’s negligence claim -that the United States failed to come forward with exculpatory evidence during his criminal trial -accrued when he was allegedly falsely convicted sometime in 1983. His claim did not accrue, as Plaintiff argues, when he finally obtained “official documentation” showing that the United States was an interested party. 1 Plaintiff’s fraud claim -that certain government officials’ responses to Plaintiff’s inquiries about his case
were untrue, misleading, and deceiving -accrued when he received the alleged responses in 2002 and 2009. Thus, Plaintiff was required to file an administrative claim with the appropriate federal agency on his negligence claim at least by 1985 and on his fraud claim at least by 2004 and 2011. Because Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he filed an proper administrative claim
within two years of the incident, or any time at all for that matter, Plaintiff’s negligence and fraud should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
II. Plaintiff’s Claim for Fraud Must be Dismissed.
Even if Plaintiff were to have exhausted his administrative remedies on his fraud claim, it should be dismissed because the FTCA specifically excludes intentional torts. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2680, “any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights” is specifically excepted from the FTCA. Plaintiff’s fraud claim is a type of
“misrepresentation.” See Clark v. United States, 2007 WL 2358630 (N.D.Cal. 2007); F.D.I.C. v. Craft, 157 F.3d 697, 706 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Owyhee Grazing Ass’n, Inc. v. Field, 637 F.2d 694, 697 (9th Cir. 1981) (“claims against the United States for fraud or misrepresentation by a federal officer are absolutely barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)”).
1 Notably, Plaintiff alleges that he obtained information that the United States was involved in 2008 (see Dkt. No. 1, at pg. 3-4), yet he still has failed to present any evidence that he filed an administrative claim, even within two years of obtaining this information.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, and the arguments set forth in the United States’ motion to dismiss, the United States respectfully requests that Plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
DATED this 22nd day of December, 2011.
Respectfully submitted,
JENNY A. DURKAN
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
s/Kristin B. Johnson
KRISTIN B. JOHNSON WSBA #28189
Assistant United States Attorney700 Stewart Street, Suite 5220
Seattle, WA 98101-1271Telephone No. (206) 553-7970Fax No. (206) 553-4073E-mail: kristin.b.johnson@usdoj.gov Attorney for the United States
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
700 STEWART STREET
SUITE 5220
UNITED STATES’ REPLY- 4
SEATTLE, W ASHINGTON 98101
(C11-0718-RSM) (206) 553-7970
Case 2:11-cv-00718-RSM Document 24 Filed 12/22/11 Page 5 of 5
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on December 22, 2011, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to the following CM/ECF participants:
Stone Dong Fan stonefan2003@hotmail.com
DATED this 22nd day of December, 2011.
s/Dung Phan
DUNG PHAN, Legal Assistant United States Attorney’s Office700 Stewart Street, Suite 5220 Seattle, Washington 98101-1271Phone: 206-553-7970
FAX: 206-553-4073
E-mail: dung.t.phan@usdoj.gov
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
700 STEWART STREET
SUITE 5220
UNITED STATES’ REPLY- 5
SEATTLE, W ASHINGTON 98101
(C11-0718-RSM) (206) 553-7970
存檔日期 12/22/11
頁數 1 of 5
地區法官: 理查德.馬丁尼斯
華盛頓州西區 西雅圖 美國地區法院
原告 范似棟 對 被告 美國
2011年10月5日,美國向法院呈交動議，要求駁回原告訴狀,其理由如下: (1)因為民法程序已廢除了冤案平反法令，而且冤案平反法令只適用於原判法院糾正該院所判案件，所以他沒有要求申請冤案平反法令的理由; (2)原告因為沒有在事發後的兩年內向適當的行政部門提交行政訴求，所以他失去了在聯邦侵權賠償法（FTCA）之下的行政補救賠償的機會; (3) 任何針對美國的民事訴訟都有6年的時效。參閱 Dkt. No. 14。
2011年12月19日,原告呈交動議，回覆被告動議。(1) 承認他不宜向這個法院申請冤案平反法令; (2) 辯稱他在FTCA名義下的訴求不存在時效問題; (3) 對美國提出新的指控，欺騙罪。 參閱 Dkt. No. 23。
I. 原告失去了在聯邦侵權賠償法（FTCA）之下的行政補救賠償的權利。
在上次要求駁回原告訴狀的動議中，美國辯稱原告因為沒有在事發後的兩年內向適當的行政部門提交行政訴求，所以他失去了在聯邦侵權賠償法名義之下的行政補救賠償的機會。參閱 Dkt. No. 14, at pg. 5-6。
聯邦侵權賠償法對侵權訴求有明確的時效期。參閱28 U.S.C. § 2401。聯邦侵權賠償法規定，訴求人必須在事發後兩年內向政府代理部門投訴，否則「針對美國的侵權訴訟就永遠被禁止」。參閱28 U.S.C. § 2401(b)。聯邦侵權賠償法的兩年時效期的規定，和其它實質法和程序法一樣，是政府主權豁免權的一項條件。參閱United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979)。因為這是主權豁免權的一部分，所以及時的行政投訴被嚴格要求執行。參閱以上案件之 117-118頁。
在原告的回覆中，他沒有對美國的辯解進行回答，他沒有說明他是否曾向政府部門提交行政投訴。他也沒有出示任何證據以證明和這次訴狀有關的他的行政投訴。單單因為這一點，原告的訴狀必須被駁回。參閱 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b)。
原告辯稱因為「罪證發現規則」他的訴求不存在時效問題。參閱 Dkt. No. 23, at pg. 10. 他聲辯他沒有及早對美國起訴是因為「他沒有實物證據或書面證據來證明美國卷入此案」，以及因為「要發現美國卷入此案的相關文字證據有困難」。參閱同上資料 pg. 3, 10.原告辯稱他最後在2008年得到了官方證據證明美國是此案的有關當事人。參閱同上資料 pg. 3-4。 從那時起，他想和中國政府和美國政府直接交涉, 最後於2011年4月他決心訴諸司法行動。參閱同上資料pg. 10。
通常來說，聯邦侵權賠償法 “訴訟提起的基礎是一個原告知道或有理由知道自己的傷害”。 參閱 Hensley v. United States, 531 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2008) (引自 Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1344 (9th Cir. 1986))。另外一般來說，政府僱員的無知和聯邦政府侵權的司法應管項目無關. (引自Dyniewicz v. United States, 742 F.2d 484, 487 (9th Cir. 1984))。 以實際情況來說，比如醫學方面的不當處置，司法應管項目不會立即發生，直至原告知道了傷害的存在和傷害的原因才會發生。(引自 Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 122-23)。 但是應管項目不包括原告意識到或不意識到政府的疏忽，不管這是真實的還是虛構的。
這樣，原告以疏忽罪對被告的指控，依其訴狀所述即美國沒有在他的1983年刑事審訊時提供無罪證明。正像原告所說，他最後得到的官方文件表明美國是個相關當事人，所以他的指控不能成立。
原告以欺騙罪對被告的指控，即指控一些政府官員從2002年到2009年對原告有關案件的回應不真實，属于誤導欺騙。原告應該在1985年以疏忽罪向有關聯邦政府部門投訴，或在2004年至2011年以欺騙罪向有關聯邦政府部門投訴。原告不能出示任何事發兩年內向行政部門投訴的證據，原告的疏忽罪和欺騙罪的訴訟，由於缺少事項司法管轄權，所以都必須被駁回。
II. 原告的欺騙罪指控必須被駁回。
即使原告曾經以欺騙罪積極進行行政投訴，現在也必須被駁回，因為聯邦侵權賠償法特別強調有意的侵權。按照 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2680, “任何起因於攻击，動武，非法拘禁，非法逮捕的指控, 惡意起訴, 誣訴，誹謗，造謠中傷，歪曲，欺騙，或者干扰合同權限”不在聯邦侵權賠償法範圍。原告的欺騙罪指控是“歪曲誤傳”( misrepresentation)的一種。參閱 Clark v. United States, 2007 WL 2358630 (N.D.Cal. 2007); F.D.I.C. v. Craft, 157 F.3d 697, 706 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Owyhee Grazing Ass’n, Inc. v. Field, 637 F.2d 694, 697 (9th Cir. 1981) “根據28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)，因為聯邦政府官員的行為而指控美國欺騙或歪曲誤傳被絕對禁止”。原告聲稱他於2008年得到美國涉及此案證據，在以後兩年中他應該進行行政投訴，但是他至今仍然沒有出示有關證據，這一點更是駁回的理由。
結論
根據以上所說，和美國前一駁回動議中的辯駁，美國懷著敬意地請求法院駁回原告的訴狀，因為該訴狀沒有說明要求賠償解決的理由，以及貴法院對該案缺少事項司法管轄權。
2011年12月22日。
珍妮 德開
美國國家律師
克莉絲蒂 約翰遜
美國國家律師助理
Case 2:11-cv-00718-RSM Document 24 Filed 12/22/11 Page 1 of 5
District Judge Ricardo S. Martinez
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE
STONE DONG FAN, ))
Plaintiff, ) NO. C11-0718-RSM )
v.
) UNITED STATES’ REPLY )
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ))
Defendants. )
__________________________________________)
On October 5, 2011, the United States filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint arguing that: (1) he failed to state a claim for relief to obtain a writ of coram nobis because the writ was abolished in civil proceedings such as this, and the writ can only issue in the court in which the conviction was had; (2) Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) by failing to file an administrative claim with the
appropriate agency within two years of the incident; and (3) any other civil claims against the United States are time barred under the general six-year statute of limitations for claims against the United States. See Dkt. No. 14. On December 19, 2011, Plaintiff filed a response where he:
(1) concedes that he cannot seek a writ of coram nobis from this Court; (2) argues that his claims are brought under the FTCA and are not time-barred; and (3) asserts a new claim for fraud. See Dkt. No. 23.
I. Plaintiff Failed to Exhaust His Administrative Remedies under the FTCA.
In its motion to dismiss, the United States argued that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the FTCA because he failed to file an administrative complaint with the appropriate agency within two years of the date it accrues. See Dkt. No. 14, at pg. 5-6.
The FTCA provides an express limitations period for the filing of a tort claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2401. Under the terms of the FTCA, a claimant is required to present his administrative claim to the agency within two years after the claim accrues, or the “tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred.” 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). The FTCA’s two-year limitations period, like other substantive or procedural restrictions on FTCA suits, is a condition on the government’s waiver of sovereign immunity. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979). Because it is part of the wavier of immunity, the requirement of the filing of a timely administrative claim must be strictly enforced. Id. at 117-118.
In his response, Plaintiff fails to address the United States’ argument. He does not claim that he ever presented an administrative claim to any agency. And he does not present any evidence to show that an administrative claim was ever filed based on the facts alleged in the complaint. On this basis alone, Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).
Plaintiff argues that his claims are not time-barred because of “the discovery rule.” See Dkt. No. 23, at pg. 10. He argues that he did not file a claim against the United States earlier because “he had no material evidence or documentary evidence which proves United States involved with the case,” and “it is difficult to find any relevant written evidence of the U.S. government directly involved with this case.” Id. at pg. 3, 10. Plaintiff argues that he finally obtained an “official document” in 2008 that “indicated America was one party concerned of the case.” Id. at pg. 3-4. Since then, he has been trying to obtain relief from the Chinese government and the U.S. government directly, and he finally decided to take legal action in April 2011. Id. at pg. 10.
As a general rule, a claim accrues under the FTCA “when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.” Hensley v. United States, 531 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1344 (9th Cir. 1986)). In addition, as a general rule, ignorance of the involvement of government employees is irrelevant to accrual of a federal tort claim. Id. (citing Dyniewicz v. United States, 742 F.2d 484, 487 (9th Cir. 1984)). In certain circumstances, such as claims involving medical malpractice, accrual
does not occur until a plaintiff knows of both the existence of an injury and its cause. Id. (citing Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 122-23). But accrual does not await a plaintiff’s awareness, whether actual or constructive, of the government’s negligence. Id.
Thus, Plaintiff’s negligence claim -that the United States failed to come forward with exculpatory evidence during his criminal trial -accrued when he was allegedly falsely convicted sometime in 1983. His claim did not accrue, as Plaintiff argues, when he finally obtained “official documentation” showing that the United States was an interested party. 1 Plaintiff’s fraud claim -that certain government officials’ responses to Plaintiff’s inquiries about his case
were untrue, misleading, and deceiving -accrued when he received the alleged responses in 2002 and 2009. Thus, Plaintiff was required to file an administrative claim with the appropriate federal agency on his negligence claim at least by 1985 and on his fraud claim at least by 2004 and 2011. Because Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he filed an proper administrative claim
within two years of the incident, or any time at all for that matter, Plaintiff’s negligence and fraud should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
II. Plaintiff’s Claim for Fraud Must be Dismissed.
Even if Plaintiff were to have exhausted his administrative remedies on his fraud claim, it should be dismissed because the FTCA specifically excludes intentional torts. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2680, “any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights” is specifically excepted from the FTCA. Plaintiff’s fraud claim is a type of
“misrepresentation.” See Clark v. United States, 2007 WL 2358630 (N.D.Cal. 2007); F.D.I.C. v. Craft, 157 F.3d 697, 706 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Owyhee Grazing Ass’n, Inc. v. Field, 637 F.2d 694, 697 (9th Cir. 1981) (“claims against the United States for fraud or misrepresentation by a federal officer are absolutely barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)”).
1 Notably, Plaintiff alleges that he obtained information that the United States was involved in 2008 (see Dkt. No. 1, at pg. 3-4), yet he still has failed to present any evidence that he filed an administrative claim, even within two years of obtaining this information.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, and the arguments set forth in the United States’ motion to dismiss, the United States respectfully requests that Plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
DATED this 22nd day of December, 2011.
Respectfully submitted,
JENNY A. DURKAN
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
s/Kristin B. Johnson
KRISTIN B. JOHNSON WSBA #28189
Assistant United States Attorney700 Stewart Street, Suite 5220
Seattle, WA 98101-1271Telephone No. (206) 553-7970Fax No. (206) 553-4073E-mail: kristin.b.johnson@usdoj.gov Attorney for the United States
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
700 STEWART STREET
SUITE 5220
UNITED STATES’ REPLY- 4
SEATTLE, W ASHINGTON 98101
(C11-0718-RSM) (206) 553-7970
Case 2:11-cv-00718-RSM Document 24 Filed 12/22/11 Page 5 of 5
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on December 22, 2011, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to the following CM/ECF participants:
Stone Dong Fan stonefan2003@hotmail.com
DATED this 22nd day of December, 2011.
s/Dung Phan
DUNG PHAN, Legal Assistant United States Attorney’s Office700 Stewart Street, Suite 5220 Seattle, Washington 98101-1271Phone: 206-553-7970
FAX: 206-553-4073
E-mail: dung.t.phan@usdoj.gov
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
700 STEWART STREET
SUITE 5220
UNITED STATES’ REPLY- 5
SEATTLE, W ASHINGTON 98101
(C11-0718-RSM) (206) 553-7970
法轮功打官司有具体人，但送不到传票，等于没打 范似棟 [44 b] 2011-12-26
